Tom Ginsburg on Political Constraints on International Courts(Ginsburg論國際法庭的政治限制)

Tom Ginsburg在SSRN上面發表了一篇文章:Political Constraints on International Courts,探討了兩種對立的觀點:Hans Morgenthau(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy有不錯的介紹)以及Hersch LauterpachtThe Function of Law in the International Community),他自己的研究取向認為對立起國際法院與內國法院似乎有點過於誇大,他認為關注於政治限制的研究有助於理解內國與國際法院,在這個基礎上區分了Ex Ante與Ex Post的差別。雖然,Tom Ginsburg較為明顯地奠基在政治學的實證研究理論之上,但是在結尾他似乎在attitudinal model與”legal model”提出了第三條路:strategic model。如何闡述這個model或許需要更多的工程。很不錯的一篇文章,推薦閱讀!!以下這段話很值得思考:

Positive theories of domestic courts start with the assumption that judicial decision-making about the law is the product of interactions among various political institutions. Courts issue decision that comport with some presumed combination of legal requirements, but whatever their goals, judges must pay some attention to the preference of other actors. For example, in the domestic legal system, a legislature can overrule a judicial interpretation of a particular statute by passing a subsequent statue. This may be easier or more difficult, depending on the institutional structure and array of political preferences at any given time. Legislatures also signal information about their reaction to courts, such that explicit overruling is not always necessary. These factors determine the size and shape of strategic space in which courts operate.

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