Posted: 05/20/2015 Filed under: Uncategorized
1. On Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism
2. How Objectivity Matters
3. Shmagency Revisited
4. Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency
5. Tort Liability and Taking Responsibility
6. Why Idealize?
7. Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What is Constitutive of Action
8. Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens
9. Ends, Means, Side-Effects, and Beyond: A Comment on the Justification of the Use of Force
10. Epistemicism and Nihilism About Vagueness: What’s the Difference?
11. Intending, Foreseeing, and the State
12. Noncognitivism, Normativity, and Belief: A Reply to Jackson
13. A Right to Violate One’s Duty
14. Rationality, Coherence, Convergence: A Critical Comment on Michael Smith’s Ethics and the A Priori
15. How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking
16. How are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?
17. The Case Against Moral Luck
18. Whose Right is it? Reflection on Harel’s Reflections on Palestinians’ Interest in Return
19. Luck between Morality, Law, and Justice
20. How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Moral Realism?
21. Some Arguments Against Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience Refuted
22. On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail’s Elements of Moral Cognition
23. Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty: A Reply to Jackson and Smith
24. On Estlund’s Democratic Authority
25. Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck
26. Wouldn’t It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a moral p)
27. The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to Understand it, and How to Cope with it
28. Can There Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent, Constructivism About Practical Reason?
29. Sense and ‘Sensitivity’: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence
30. Reason-Giving and the Law
31. Moral Luck and the Law
32. Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement
33. Giving Practical Reasons
34. Authority and Reason-Giving
35. Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge
36. A Comment on Yaffe’s Attempts